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Making Worlds, Making Subjects: 
Contemporary Art and the Affective Dimension of Global Ethics 
Marsha Meskimmon 
  
In his article for the present issue of World Art, Terry Smith offers a thoughtful account of the 
global impact of contemporary art that neither presumes the category itself (‘contemporary 
art’) nor neglects the spatio-temporal dynamics of its worldly engagement. Rather, Smith’s 
text focuses on what he calls ‘currents of world-making’ that enable his enquiry to test the 
limits of what we understand to be ‘contemporary’ practice whilst acknowledging the agency 
of art in the production of ‘worlds’, themselves mutable, complex and multi-layered. 
 
Smith is not afraid to say that contemporary art is ‘essentially, definitively and distinctively 
worldly.’ [3, italics in original] The effect of this position is both to refute the notion of art as a 
transcendent aesthetic category beyond the material reach of history and to argue strongly 
for its embeddedness within the specific spatio-temporal location(s) of its production and 
consumption. As Smith contends, art is ’from the whole world’ and may well become ‘for the 
world … the world as it is now, and as it might be.’ [3, italics in original] It is the latter element 
of that claim (‘for… the world… as it might be’), when extended to consider the ethical 
dimensions of ‘contemporary world art’, that I find especially compelling. 
 
Clearly, what constitutes ‘the world’ (and its art) is pivotal to Smith’s article, to any 
consideration of art’s ethical agency and, indeed, to this journal. In the first issue of World 
Art, the editors offered a series of provocative statements on precisely this point, referring to 
a ‘network of diverse intellectual, artistic and curatorial activities centred on human creativity’, 
an ‘unfolding matrix of practice-based networks’ and to the ‘world-wide field of writing, 
making and sensing art.’ (Editorial 1:1 2010, 1-7) The emphasis placed in these statements 
upon networks and overlapping fields of activity suggests that ‘world art’ might be understood 
as in the making; arguably, this opens closed intellectual and disciplinary categories to new 
forms of enquiry and, I would suggest, to the significant question of difference. 
 
The account of ‘the world’ in Smith’s text accords with the open-ended matrices proposed by 
the editors of World Art, and, crucially, is neither premised upon a generalised, a-historical 
model nor harnessed to the radical relativism that too commonly undermines arguments 
around process and multiplicity. Smith’s account of ‘the world’ is developed through the 
worldliness of contemporary art, by which he means an art that has emerged in distinct 
currents ‘since the later decades of the twentieth century’ [8] and is embedded within a 
particular experience of ‘the world’ as meaning ‘a number of different things. But not an 
infinite number, nor even a plurality; rather, a specific cluster of different things.’ [5]  
 
This cluster brings Smith to time. The three currents of world-making that, he argues, 
distinguish contemporary art are precisely locatable within the etymology of the 
‘contemporary’; they are ‘with time’. The first current consists of what Smith calls ‘official, 
institutionalized Contemporary Art’, [8] an art typified by ‘Remodernism’ and ‘Retro-
Sensationalism’ [9]. Smith’s terms might seem coded, but are, in fact, powerfully descriptive 
and very effective in defining this current – it is the mainstream work that feeds every large-
scale, metropolitan museum of contemporary art in the world today. Smith delineates his 
second current as ‘the transnational turn’ [10], an art driven by a post- and/or anti-colonial 
aspiration for a cosmopolitan world, fostered by dialogues between the local and the global 
that take place through the international circuits of the art world (typified by numerous bi- and 
triennials). The third current in Smith’s model is more ‘personal, small-scale and modest’ 
[12]; it is the result of the work of many individual artists and loose collectives who operate at 
the interstices of new and old media to explore the possibility of sustainable communities and 
‘close-valued placemaking’ [14]. 
 
Smith’s commitment to locating the multiple worlds-in-the-making that constitute the field of 
contemporary art distinguishes his account from much of the current literature circulating 
through the global art market that attempts to make the work palatable, and thus, easy to 
consume. (Cf. Smith 2009; 2011) Smith, instead, maintains a politics around the production 
and consumption of meaning in contemporary art that is laudable and I found the invitation to 
respond to his article here both exciting and challenging. 
 
As I suggested earlier in this piece, it is the extension of Smith’s argument concerning the 
worldliness of contemporary art (in and through time) toward an understanding of the ethical 
potential of contemporary practice that I would like to explore. Smith’s astute argument 
recognises the political dimension of contemporary art’s space- and placemaking potential 
through distinctive, yet coeval, temporal currents. Though the three ‘currents’ are framed 
within the article as simply concurrent, I would suggest that Smith’s definition of the currents 
can be seen to set up a more complex, materialist account of the historical processes of 
contemporary practice by means of what might be called a contemporal dialectic. That is, the 
first, official, current stands in his account in the position of a thesis, the second current – 
where we have ‘for decades’ had work that ‘matches the strongest art of the first current’ [10] 
– an antithesis, and, the third current, defined by ‘younger artists… draw[ing] on elements of 
the first two tendencies’ [12], produces a synthesis. Significantly, that synthesis points toward 
the future. 
 
Temporally, then, Smith’s account is not simply a diachronic progress narrative, nor is it a 
straightforward case of synchronicity; the currents of the contemporal dialectic described 
here produce a ‘thickened’ present [4] that admits of difference and diversity. And, if the ‘con-
temporaneity’ of art is profoundly embedded within the world, then it can have a significant 
role to play in imagining the world otherwise – in becoming ‘for the world’ not just as it is, but 
‘as it might be’. These insights imply that art might elicit an ethical agency, but, as I have 
argued elsewhere, this necessitates us thinking through art beyond even a ‘thickened’ 
present toward the production of a non-teleological future. (Meskimmon 2003; 2010)   
 
Engaging productively with the time of contemporary art in this sense does more than 
describe its embeddedness within the world as it exists now, it offers the potential to make 
the world otherwise in future. Smith alludes to this in several places, specifically in relation to 
the third current or synthesis, where he writes of ‘imagin(ing) possible worlds’ [13], as a 
‘hope-filled enterprise’ [15], but his central concerns are not with the ethical agency of 
contemporary art. I should like, in the spirit of the present dialogue with Smith’s text, to 
develop some ideas around this ‘hope-filled’ enterprise in what follows. 
 
I am interested in arguments concerning the temporal dimension of contemporary art for a 
number of reasons, not least because I am committed to thinking through the question of 
art’s agency in world-making, which I would suggest finds its greatest resonance in the 
interconnection between ethics and aesthetics. That is, the ethical agency of art does not 
merely reside within a teleological model of world-making where the present always delivers 
the image of itself as the future, but rather within the registers of imagination, affect and the 
logic of the gift – where the future can be made anew and opened to difference. Thus the 
future, while absolutely intertwined with the material legacy of the past and present, is not 
predetermined by it; the direction of the future cannot be compelled or contained by a 
reflection of the past or, as Moira Gatens put it: 
 
It’s not as if one says ‘here is the future, a blueprint’, but rather by questioning past 
practices and by revaluing present practices, one causes a shift or a tremor in the 
web. (Maras and Rizzo 1995, 65) 
 
Moreover, while art is a highly contested and political terrain, it does not command legislative 
force, nor can it compel subjects to act in a monolithic or unified manner. Thus I do not 
equate the potential of art to make worlds with a political imperative of the contractual sort; 
art compels, but it does so at the level of the subject and through the power of the cultural 
imaginary. In this sense, I would suggest that art is absolutely embedded within the 
geopolitical conditions of its time, that it is, as Smith says, worldly, but that its world-making 
agency is ethical. More strongly, I would argue that as a mode of ethical agency, art’s 
potential is particular, not general or overarching.  
 
Art is capable of mobilising sensory forms of engagement and tapping into affective 
economies of meaning that can enable subjects to imagine difference, to encounter diverse 
others and to respond to them.  Arguably, art can develop our ‘response-ability’ in such a 
way as to (re)connect us with (very different) others in the world – it can interpellate subjects 
as embodied and materially located or ‘enworlded’. And, as Kelly Oliver has argued 
eloquently, ‘(t)here is a direct connection between the response-ability of subjectivity and 
ethical and political responsibility.’ (Oliver 2001, 19) 
 
Connections made through art between subjective response-ability and social, political and 
ethical responsibility have important ramifications for thinking subjectivity in and as sociality, 
as an embedded, phenomenological condition of becoming a fully-sensory subject. 
Significantly, this reconception of the subject challenges the idea that subjects individuate, or 
come into being as ‘singular’ selves, through a process of separation and rejection of 
other(nes)s. Differentiation need not be a brutal isolation of the self from the other, but a 
mutual recognition of difference that includes generosity and intercorporeal interdependence. 
The subject thus interpellated is not founded in originary violence or a rejection of a 
generalised ‘other’, but in interconnection with particular others in the world, with whom we 
share pressing concerns.  
The development of the fully social, fully sensory, subject is at the heart of contemporary 
art’s articulation of an ethical address to the political conditions of globalization. Where 
artworks can offer us the imaginative space to encounter difference, they may also enable us 
to mobilize the nexus between response-ability and responsibility, such that a change that is 
effected at the level of the subject has the potential to transform social and political life in 
material ways. 
The transformative potential of contemporary art is not assured, not able to be contracted, 
frequently fleeting and quixotic. It engages with imagination at the flashpoint between the 
cultural imaginary and the imaginative worlds of individuals and moves in the fluid channels 
of aesthetics and affect. It is profoundly constitutive of subjectivity and culture and yet not 
fixed; contemporary art’s ethical agency partakes of the logic of the gift. 
While this is not the place to examine the literature on ‘the gift’ in detail, it is important that I 
am clear about my own use of this complex term here. Aware of Jacques Derrida’s critique of 
the gift (Derrida 1992), I nonetheless maintain the alignment of the gift and generosity with a 
notion of social interaction beyond contractual reciprocity. I follow the work of, for example, 
Paul Ricoeur and Rosalyn Diprose in thinking through the notion of the gift as linked to an 
intersubjective, intercorporeal conception of the subject engendered through generosity and 
a commitment to the open potential of the future, beyond teleology or the mute reflection of 
the past. In this way, I connect the logic of the gift, the open-ended future and the response-
able subject with the ethical agency of contemporary art as it makes worlds, rather than 
mirrors them. 
Specifically, Ricoeur developed a linguistic construction of the gift as a form of future-
oriented, ethical generosity that moves from the logic of exchange/demand (‘I give so that 
you will give’), to an open-ended formulation: ‘Give because it has been given you’. (Ricoeur 
1996, 36) If Ricoeur’s formulation demonstrates the potential of the gift to establish social 
relations open to transformation and difference in time, Diprose’s work on embodiment, 
ethics and generosity, articulated the transformative power of the gift as ‘… being given to 
others without deliberation in a field of intercorporeality, a being given that constitutes the self 
as affective and being affected, that constitutes social relations and that which is given in 
relation.’ (Diprose 2002, 5) For Diprose, generosity and the gift predicate both sociality and 
the self in a relation of mutuality and intimate interconnection. Additionally, her conception of 
generosity works at the level of affectivity, not, she makes clear, as a kind of personal 
‘feeling’ but as ‘the production and transformation of the corporeal self through others. So 
understood, affectivity is also the domain of politics.’ (Diprose 2002, 75)  
Placing affectivity at the heart of her conception of intercorporeal subjectivity, Diprose’s 
argument reinforces the significance of aesthetics to ethics. Artworks have the potential to 
interpellate response-able/responsible subjects and enable the emergence of a generous 
connection with others, without negating the pressing problems of globalization and the 
iniquitous power relations it produces. However, whilst I am arguing that transformations in 
subjectivity can occur through the agency of future-oriented generosity, I am not arguing that 
every work of art is a ‘gift’ and certainly not that artists ‘give us gifts’. That would return us to 
the co-opted logic of contract and not of generosity – indeed it would make it impossible for 
any art in a global marketplace to demonstrate ethical agency.  
Distinguishing between the economies of the gift and the market is important here, since my 
argument suggests that contemporary art can signify differently within, and sometimes as a 
counter to, the global marketplace. Art is thoroughly embedded within global markets and 
invoking the logic of the gift does not seek to negate that through a misplaced philosophical 
idealism. Contemporary art is a high-level commodity, frequently traded between key 
metropolitan centres, circulated through bi- and triennials, and used as a form of ‘cultural 
capital’ to mark global corporate partnerships. But it is precisely the embeddedness of art 
within the global marketplace that enables it to engage with pressing political and ethical 
questions concerning location, power and difference. Contemporary art is worldly, it 
circulates within the world, within the market economy, but it does not simply exist in 
bondage to hegemonic structures of meaning, knowledge or subjectivity.  
Affective agency has transformative potential, an ability to use the material of the past and 
present to change the future and engender the new. Indeed, contemporary art’s ability to 
mobilize the gift from within the market provides a much stronger ethical imperative than an 
idealist formulation of the gift as a ‘realm’ outside or beyond the conditions of globalization. 
And, if contemporary art is indeed worldly - from the world and for the world, both as it is and 
as it might be – then we must be prepared to make the case that it can and does, at some 
times, and in some places, make worlds that imagine connections and relations between 
very different others for whom and with whom we are responsible in our shared worlds.  
 
 
 
 
References 
 
Derrida, Jacques. (1992) Given Time 1: Counterfeit Money University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago and London 
 
Diprose, Rosalyn. (2002) Corporeal Generosity: On Giving with Nietzsche, Merleau-Ponty 
and Levinas, SUNY Press, Albany NY 
 
The Editors. (2010) ‘Editorial’, World Art, 1:1, 1-7 
 
Maras, Steven and Teresa Rizzo. (1995) ‘On Becoming: An Interview with Moira Gatens’, 
Southern Review, 28, 53-68 
 
Meskimmon, Marsha. (2003) Women Making Art: History, Subjectivity, Aesthetics  
Routledge, London and New York 
 
Meskimmon, Marsha. (2010) Contemporary Art and the Cosmopolitan Imagination  
Routledge, London and New York 
 
Oliver, Kelly. (2001) Witnessing: Beyond Recognition Minnesota University Press, 
Minneapolis, MN and London  
 
Ricoeur, Paul. (1996) ‘Love and Justice’ in Paul Ricoeur: The Hermeneutics of Action, ed. 
Richard Kearney, Sage, London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi, 23-39 
 
Smith, Terry. (2009) What is Contemporary Art? University of Chicago Press, Chicago IL 
 
